



11 – 13 September 2023, Copenhagen, Denmark

2023

IAFIE and IAFIE EC Annual Conference

FUTURES OF INTELLIGENCE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD



Conference Program

In collaboration with:



**ROYAL DANISH
DEFENCE COLLEGE**



**Norwegian Defence
University College**

11 SEPTEMBER (MONDAY)

0820-0845 *Bus transport from hotels (Departure Wake-Up Hotel Borgergade 0820; Departure Babette Hotel 0825)*

0845-0915 *Coffee and registration*

0915-0945 **Opening remarks by RDDC, NDUC and IAFIE**

Room: AUD 118

- Maya Mynster Christensen (Royal Danish Defence College) & Tom Røseth (Norwegian Defence University College)
- Henrik Breitenbauch (Dean, Royal Danish Defence College) & Saira Basit (Dean, Norwegian Defence University College)
- Irena Chiru (Chair, IAFIE Europe) & Barry Zulauf (President, IAFIE)

0945-1045 **Keynote lecture: Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen**

Room: AUD 118

Danish Defence Intelligence Service

Moderator: Maya Mynster Christensen (Royal Danish Defence College)

1045-1100 *Coffee break*

1100-1200 **Panel 1 What is Intelligence? Why Does it Matter?**

Room: AUD 118

Chair: Frederic S. Baron (National Intelligence University)

- Andrew Macpherson (University of New Hampshire)
- Bob de Graaff (University of Utrecht)
- Adam Diderichsen (University of Southern Denmark)

1200-1300 *Lunch*

1300-1430 **Panel 2
Competitive Intelligence**
Room: AUD 75

Chair: Amir Fleischman
(Cicom Global)

Discussant: Erik Elgersma
(Strategic Analysis Services BV)

- David Kamien (Mind-Alliance Systems):
'Leveraging AI to Surface Contextually-Relevant Intelligence Questions'
- Pierre Memheld (Ex Humano Management):
'How AI can improve

**Panel 3
New Technologies and Cyber**

Room: Niels Juel

Chair: Jim Poole
(Analytical Trainer and Consultant)

Discussant: Markus Züdoff Widborg
(Norwegian Defence University College)

- Christian Jaehger
(Royal Danish Defence College):
'The threat system'
- Andrew Macpherson
(University of New

**Roundtable 1
Russia's War Against Ukraine and the Importance of OSINT**
Room: AUD 118

Chair: Iris Salazar (Recorded Future)

- Jack McCurley (Recorded Future)
- Julius Nicklasson (Recorded Future)
- Chris Holden (Recorded Future)
- David Carver (Recorded Future)

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| competitive intelligence processes’ | Hampshire),
Jennifer Rose |
| • George Alexe (Krugman & Partners): ‘The Relevance of ESG on Strategy and Competitive Intelligence in a Changing Business Landscape’ | (Center for Pedagogical Innovation) & Taylor Nydam (University of New Hampshire): ‘Humans vs. Artificial Intelligence’ |
| • Janet Baker (JMB Diagnostics): ‘How can AI enhance the role of SAT’s in Competitive Intelligence’ | • Clayton Hawes (Independent scholar): ‘Use of ChatGPT and Artificial Intelligence by Cybercriminal and Non-State Actors’ |
| • Erik Elgersma (Strategic Analysis Services BV): ‘The case for scenario planning’ | |

1430-1445 *Coffee break*

1445-1600 **Roundtable 2**
Critical Success Factors in European Intelligence Education: An Open Debate
Room: AUD 118

Chair/Discussant: Peter de Werd (Netherlands Defence Academy)

- Irena Chiru (Mihai Viteazul National Intelligence Academy, Romania)
- Georgică Panfil (European Defence and Security College)
- Aitana Radu (University of Malta)
- François Fischer (Intelligence College in Europe)

1630 *Bus transport to Frederiksberg Castle*

1715 *Photo and reception*

1915 *Bus transport to city centre or hotel*

12 SEPTEMBER (TUESDAY)

0820-0845 *Bus transport from hotels (Departure Wake-Up Hotel Borgergade 0820; Departure Babette Hotel 0825)*

0845-0915 *Coffee*

0915-1015 **Keynote lecture: Kristin Ven Bruusgaard**
Room: AUD 118
 Norwegian Defence Intelligence
 Moderator: Tom Røseth (Norwegian Defence University College)

1015-1030 *Coffee break*

1030-1200	Panel 4 Intelligence Processes and Analysis <i>Room: AUD 118</i> Chair: Christoph Harig (Royal Danish Defence College) Discussant: Irena Chiru (Mihai Viteazul National Intelligence Academy, Romania) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Jan-Jaap Oerlemans (Utrecht University) & Sander Langenhuijzen (Dutch Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services): 'Regulating Automated OSINT' Katherine Hibbs Pherson (Pherson Associates): 'Analytic 	Panel 5 Open Source Intelligence and AI <i>Room: Hercules</i> Chair: Craig Gruber (American University) Discussants: Aitana Radu (University of Malta); Andrew Borene <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dirk Kolb & Philip Starz (Traversals Analytics and Intelligence): 'AI-powered OSINT in use' Bryson Payne & Edward Mienie (University of North Georgia): 'Artificial Disruption' Vitalii Fedoriienko (The National University of Defense of Ukraine): 'Ways of 	Panel 6 Intelligence Methods and Forecasting <i>Room: Niels Juel</i> Chair: Barry Zulauf (President, IAFIE) Discussant: Adam Diderichsen (University of Southern Denmark) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gideon Manger (Netherlands Defence Academy): 'A systematic review of effectiveness in intelligence' Jozef Kozlowski (War Studies University Warsaw): 'Methodology and ethics in intelligence analysis' Raffaele Magurano (Police Officer, Italian Local Police): 'Forecasting Techniques' Terrence M O'Sullivan (University of New Hampshire) & 	Panel 7 Intelligence Cultures and Collaboration <i>Room: AUD 75</i> Chair: Frederic S Baron (Office of the Director of National Intelligence) Discussant: Cristina Ivan (Mihai Viteazul National Intelligence Academy, Romania) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ofer Guterman (Institute for the Research of the Methodology of Intelligence): 'Open Intelligence' Adam Svendsen (International intelligence and defence strategist): 'Near yet far?' John Nomikos (Research Institute for European and American Studies): 'European Intelligence Academy' Eleni Braat (Utrecht University): 'Fighting Fire with Fire' Ahmed ElTahir Abubakr (Emirates Academy for Identity and Citizenship): 'Cognitive
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| <p>thinking for security and cyber operations'</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tore Pedersen (Norwegian Intelligence School) & Pia Therese Jansen (Norwegian Defence University College): 'Fluent Secrets – Disfluent OSINTs' | <p>implementing OSINT'</p> | <p>James D. Ramsay (Macquarie University): 'Bridging the intelligence-public health / pandemic security chasm'</p> | <p>diversity as a key driver for promoting inter-agency intelligence collaboration'</p> |
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1200-1300 *Lunch*

1300-1400 **Roundtable 3**
Intelligence Education: Imperative for Change

Room: AUD 118

Chair: James D. Ramsay (Macquarie University)

Discussant: David Strachan-Morris (University of Leicester)

- Robin Lobb (Zeroes & Ones, Inc.)
- Sabrina Magris (École Universitaire Internationale, Italy)
- Barry Zulauf (President, IAFIE)

1400-1415 *Coffee break*

1415-1535 **Panel 8**
Military Intelligence and Intelligence Tradecraft

Room: AUD 75

Chair: Katherine Hibbs Pherson (Pherson Associates)

Discussant: Nis Leerskov Mathiesen (Royal Danish Defence College)

- Omid Townsend (King's College London): 'Enhancing civilian and student counterintelligence capabilities'
- Freddy Murstad (Norwegian University of Science and Technology): 'Current advances in approaches to intelligence tradecraft'
- Bram Spoor, Sebastiaan Rietjens & Erik de Waard (Netherlands)

Panel 9
Deception and Fake News

Room: AUD 118

Chair: Bill Spracher (Vice President, IAFIE)

Discussant: Sabrina Magris (École Universitaire Internationale)

- Netanel Flamer (Bar-Ilan University): 'Asymmetric battle of wits'
- Gareth Jones (Tiaki Akoako (AUT University):

Roundtable 4
Countering Disinformation: Pointers for Educators in Intelligence and National Security

Room: Niels Juel

Chair: Randy Pherson (Pherson Associates)

- Peter de Werd (Netherlands Defence Academy)
- Cristina Ivan (Mihai Viteazul National Intelligence Academy, Romania)

- Defence Academy): 'The complexity of the grey-zone'
- David Strachan-Morris (University of Leicester): 'Framing defining, and studying military intelligence'
- William L. Mitchell (Chief Adviser, Danish Special Operations Command): 'Operational timeline deception projection'
- Tony Ingesson (Lund University): 'Predictable professionals'
- Carol Choksy (Indiana University Bloomington)

1545-1645 Roundtable 5 The Future of Structured Analytical Techniques and the Role of Academia
Room: AUD 118

Chair: Jim Poole (Analytical Trainer & Consultant)

- John Pyrik (Analytical Trainer)
- Randy Pherson (Pherson Associates)
- Ole Donner (Strukturierte Analyse Deutschland)
- John Wayne Ross (Privy Council Office, Government of Canada)

1650 *Bus transport to hotels (Arrival Babette Hotel 1710; Arrival Wake-Up Hotel 1715)*
Short break

1830 *Bus transport to Nyholm (Departure Babette Hotel 1830; Departure Wake-Up Hotel 1835)*

1900-2200 *Conference dinner*

2200 *Bus transport to hotels*

13 SEPTEMBER (WEDNESDAY)

- 0830-0900 *Bus transport from hotels (Departure Wake-Up Hotel Borgergade 0830; Departure Babette Hotel 0835)*
- 0900-1000 **Authors' Roundtable**
Room: AUD 118
Chair: Bill Spracher (Vice President, IAFIE)
- Craig Gruber and Benjamin Trachik, eds., *Fostering Innovation in the Intelligence Community: Scientifically-Informed Solutions to Combat a Dynamic Threat Environment*, Springer Publishing, 2023
 - Randy Pherson, Oliver Gnad, and Ole Donner, *Clear Thinking: Theory and Practice of Strategic Foresight and Structured Analysis Techniques*, Springer Publishing, 2023
 - Tom Roseth and Tobias Saether, "Russian Annexation of Crimea -- An Intelligence Warning Failure?," book chapter in Bjorn Gronning and Stig Stenslie, eds., *Contemporary Warning Cases*, Edinburgh Press, 2023
 - James Ramsay, highlighting the *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, with a brief mention of a few other intelligence/homeland security-related journals
- 1000-1100 **Roundtable 6 Russian Intelligence Practices during the War in Ukraine, 2022-2023**
Room: AUD 118
Chair: Olga Bertelsen (Tiffin University)
Discussant: Tom Røseth (Norwegian Defence University College)
- Olga Bertelsen (Tiffin University)
 - Sergei Zhuk (Ball State University)
 - Amir Fleischman (Cicom Global)
- 1100-1115 *Coffee*
- 1115-1215 **Roundtable 7 Intelligence Practices in Scandinavia**
Room: AUD 118
Chair: Kira Vrist Rønn (University of Southern Denmark)
- Tony Ingesson (Lund University)
 - Tore Pedersen (Norwegian Intelligence School)
 - Tallat Rønn Shakoor (University of Southern Denmark)
 - Adam Diderichsen (University of Southern Denmark)
- 1215-1315 *Lunch*
- 1315-1345 **Lifetime Achievement Award**
Room: AUD 118
- 1345-1400 **Closing remarks and IAFIE 2024 announcement**
Room: AUD 118
- 1400-1430 **IAFIE Business Meeting**
Room: AUD 118

Presenters/Moderators: Barry Zulauf, Irena Chiru, Craig Gruber, Erik Elgersma, Sabrina Magris, Charles Gallagher, Robin Lobb, David Strachan-Morris, Amir Fleischmann, Peter de Werd

11 SEPTEMBER (MONDAY)

Panel 1 – What is Intelligence? Why Does it Matter?

Room: AUD 118

Chair/Discussant: Frederic S. Baron (National Intelligence University)

- Andrew Macpherson (University of New Hampshire)
- Bob de Graaff (University of Utrecht)
- Adam Diderichsen (University of Southern Denmark)

Found: A Definition of Intelligence

Andrew Macpherson (University of New Hampshire) and Glenn Hastedt (James Madison University)

There are at least three articles in *Studies in Intelligence* and numerous books and manuscripts where CIA alumni offer their definitions of intelligence and why it is important to practitioners. Works from Bimfort, Kent, Lowenthal, Random, and Warner are must reads for intelligence studies scholars representing a venerable who's who in the discipline. Spanning over 50 years of scholarship these works provide qualitative assessments of what intelligence is and what it is not. In this paper we offer an alternative lens for our audience as they judge the available definitions of "intelligence". We offer a quantitative analysis of 37 academic, professional, and other intelligence definitions and organizations worldwide to advance the debate over the "correct" definition of intelligence.

Two Souls in One Body: The Acknowledgement of Intelligence as Influence Activity

Bob de Graaff (University of Utrecht)

A large majority of all definitions of intelligence describe it in terms of information that has to be processed in order to provide (fore)knowledge. However, intelligence agencies not only describe and try to predict reality, they also try to influence and shape it. Consequently, definitions that include only the information part and not the influence part fall short if students are supposed to be prepared for working in intelligence agencies. Recognizing the different qualities that are required to execute intelligence's two main functions, i.e. analyzing and influencing, it is recommended that intelligence definitions include both its information and its influence component.

The intelligence style of reasoning

Adam Diderichsen (University of Southern Denmark)

Scientific practices are characterized by a specific form of thinking or 'style' of reasoning, which predominate within that practice (Hacking, 2004a, 2004b). In this intervention, I discuss the intelligence style of reasoning. I argue that this style of thinking is based on a distinction between friends and enemies. It is, in other words, an adversarial style of reasoning. Within this general conceptual framework, the style of reasoning has a number of more specific features. First, secrecy is all-important in adversarial reasoning, since it is often essential both to keep information hidden from the adversary and to acquire information that the adversary would like to keep secret. Second, it makes it difficult, when assessing information, to draw a clear line between purely epistemic criteria and loyalty. When assessing a source's credibility, it is for instance important to know whether the source is an ally, a citizen, or an opponent, i.e. to locate the source on a scale from friend to foe. Third, the intelligence style of reasoning is based on the assumption that knowledge can be produced, not by an individual, but by a large, hierarchic organization, and more specifically that an epistemic process – learning or getting to know something – can be translated into or rendered as an organizational process. Fourth, at least in a modern Western context, the style of reasoning is also closely

connected to an epistemic ideal of objectivity and truthfulness, given rise to the ideal of speaking truth to power. In sum, the intelligence style of reasoning aims at objective, often secret knowledge produced by a large hierarchical organization and useful in an adversarial context.

Panel 2 – Competitive Intelligence

Room: AUD 75

Chair: Amir Fleischman (Cicom Global)

Discussant: Erik Elgersma (Strategic Analysis Services BV)

- David Kamien (Mind-Alliance Systems)
- Pierre Memheld (Ex Humano Management)
- George Alexe (Krugman & Partners)
- Janet Baker (JMB Diagnostics)
- Erik Elgersma (Strategic Analysis Services BV)

Leveraging AI to Surface Contextually-Relevant Intelligence Questions

David Kamien (Mind-Alliance Systems)

David Kamien, the CEO and founder of Mind-Alliance Systems (www.mind-alliance.com), will discuss use cases where AI-powered software can help analysts produce higher-value open-source intelligence reports and client alerts about regulation changes. Among other functionality, Large Language Model (LLM)-powered AI can help elicit requirements, generate questions for analysts, and help them consider new perspectives. David will touch upon future neuro-symbolic AI approaches that combine Knowledge Representation & Reasoning, causal reasoning, and Large Language Models. Finally, David will provide an overview of the IAFIE USA - Georgetown University workshop on "Responsible AI in Intelligence Analysis" (September 28-29, 2023 in Washington, DC).

How AI can improve competitive intelligence processes

Pierre Memheld (Ex Humano Management)

In today's fiercely competitive business landscape, intelligence analysis plays a crucial role in guiding strategic decision-making. This presentation explores how Artificial Intelligence (AI) can significantly enhance structured intelligence analysis, empowering analysts to extract deeper insights from vast and complex datasets. The session will delve into key structured analysis techniques such as SWOT analysis, trend analysis, scenario planning, and more, illustrating how AI can augment each step of the process. The integration of AI-powered data collection and processing tools allows analysts to efficiently gather information from diverse sources, including competitor websites, social media, and industry reports. Natural Language Processing (NLP) capabilities enable the analysis of unstructured text data, extracting sentiment, key information, and emerging trends from news articles, customer reviews, and social media content. AI's prowess in data visualization creates interactive and visually appealing representations of complex data, facilitating a deeper understanding of trends, patterns, and relationships. Additionally, predictive analytics and scenario simulation empower analysts to anticipate potential future scenarios, enabling more informed decision-making. Throughout the presentation, ethical considerations related to AI usage in intelligence analysis will be addressed, including data privacy and bias mitigation. The value of human-AI collaboration will also be emphasized, underscoring the importance of human analysts' expertise and judgment in conjunction with AI-generated insights. By showcasing the benefits and possibilities of AI in structured intelligence analysis, this presentation aims to inspire conference attendees to embrace AI as a transformative tool that can revolutionize the way intelligence is gathered, analyzed, and leveraged in today's competitive landscape.

Attendees will be encouraged to harness AI responsibly and creatively to enhance their competitive intelligence efforts, positioning their organizations for success in an ever-evolving business environment

The Relevance of ESG on Strategy and Competitive Intelligence in a Changing Business Landscape

George Alexe (Krugman & Partners)

This paper explores the growing significance of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) considerations in the business world and its impact on strategy and competitive intelligence. ESG factors have evolved from being supplementary metrics to becoming crucial indicators of a company's sustainability and competitiveness in the contemporary global market. The emergence of climate change, geopolitical uncertainties, and other challenges highlights the necessity for businesses to adopt ESG-focused practices to adapt and thrive. Drawing parallels with the historical wisdom of Sun Tzu's "The Art of War," the paper emphasizes the importance of understanding both one's own organization and the dynamic external landscape, including ESG factors, to gain a competitive edge. Companies that effectively incorporate ESG principles stand to benefit in several ways, including enhanced talent attraction, access to high-growth market segments, cost-saving measures, and improved access to cheaper capital. The Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) in the European Union is introduced as a key legislation that compels large companies and listed SMEs to regularly disclose their non-financial performance, encouraging responsible business practices. As ESG gains prominence in board-level discussions, companies are increasingly striving to be leaders in this domain, knowing that early movers can shape entire sectors. However, the paper acknowledges that the ESG landscape faces challenges. The subjective and unregulated nature of ESG data and ratings raises concerns about credibility and standardization. Yet, the trend of sustainable investments indicates a high demand for such opportunities, while the need for standardization and transparency grows to ensure legitimacy and recognition of sustainable practices. The paper concludes that embracing ESG as a competitive advantage requires commitment, resources, knowledge, planning, and effective execution. It calls for companies to take a broader perspective on organizational health beyond mere financials and balance sheets, considering their impact on the environment, society, and stakeholders. The significance of ESG is projected to continue evolving, shaping the competitive landscape in all industries in the years to come.

How can AI enhance the role of SAT's in Competitive Intelligence?

Janet Baker (JMB Diagnostics)

As Artificial Intelligence (AI) rapidly becomes smarter, it has been widely adopted in private industry to provide real-time data tracking, insights, and actionable competitive intelligence (CI). AI allows users to process far more information than previously possible—faster and more efficiently. Despite this, as businesses both small and large increasingly rely on AI powered platforms to maintain or gain competitive advantage, a recent trend in CI is recognition of the need for "Human Analysis and Curation" to provide more "accurate and actionable insights" than use of AI alone. Structured Analytic Techniques (SATs) are universally applicable, non-computer-based tools used by analysts to mitigate the impact of cognitive bias, misapplied heuristics, and intuitive traps while "decreasing error rates and avoiding intelligence failures." With the adoption and use of SATs across a wide variety of disciplines, an increasingly important question in 2023 is where and how AI tools can be harnessed to complement analysts' uniquely human factors in the performance of these techniques. In this study, we analyze each technique to determine which, if any, AI capabilities will add value. Seven AI functions which can facilitate the use of SATs were identified; each step in the SAT process may be supported by zero to seven AI capabilities. Using this detailed analysis, a matrix was created showing AI utility across five families of SATs including Exploration, Diagnostic, Reframing, Foresight, and Decision Support Techniques ranking representative techniques in level of support AI can provide. For example, AI could prove highly valuable in building Chronologies and Timelines and an Indicators list but of limited utility in conducting a Key Assumptions Check or generating alternative hypotheses. Data

will be collected from instructors and students taking courses in Structured Analytic Techniques. These data will be compiled in the matrix and consensus ratings will be established by Pherson Associates' instructors who are fluent in SATs. We propose that AI can and should play a significant role in the use of SATs. However, SATs are thinking tools for analysts with human cognition, creativity, and relationships. We predict analysts in private industry CI and government agencies alike will be augmented rather than replaced by AI.

The case for scenario planning

Erik Elgersma (Strategic Analysis Services BV)

In "the case for scenario planning" the teaching approach and student results of teaching Scenario Planning to 2nd year B.Sc. students in a business school will be presented. Each of the questions why, when, where, who, what and how regarding scenario planning will be covered. Emphasis will be on the how question. We will demonstrate that:

- Application of a real-life (fictive) business case makes the topic tangible to relatively junior students
- Scenario planning is a tool that is part of a broader strategy design tool kit
- Scenario planning benefits' are largest when the most relevant external uncertainties to a business have been properly identified and chosen as basis
- Ideally an even number of potential future (scenarios) are defined
- For each scenario, a name, narrative, business implications and corresponding actions must be defined

Positive and not-so-positive results of this teaching approach will be discussed.

Panel 3 – New Technologies and Cyber

Room: Niels Juel

Chair: Jim Poole (Analytical Trainer, Mentor, Coach and Consultant)

Discussant: Markus Züddoff Widborg (Norwegian Defence University College)

- Christian Jaehger (Royal Danish Defence College)
- Andrew Macpherson (University of New Hampshire), Jennifer Rose (Center for Pedagogical Innovation) & Taylor Nydam (University of New Hampshire)
- Clayton Hawes (Institute of World Politics)

The Threat System – a systems-based approach to Weapons Technical Intelligence and more

Christian Jaehger (Royal Danish Defence College)

With the current intelligence and security landscape being characterized to a large extent by the emergence and weaponization of new technologies, the need for better integration of specialist technical knowledge into the regular conduct of analysis appears especially pertinent. The purpose of this paper is to present a methodology for this, as it aims to present a consolidated analytical framework for conducting Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI) across multiple threat domains. Such a framework creates a common platform upon which specialists and generalists can engage in discussion to contextualize a given threat to the relevant circumstances. In the course of developing and applying the Threat Systems concept, the framework has also yielded positive results in use-cases beyond the WTI field. The presentation will include a number of examples of further application and future perspectives. Furthermore, this paper aims to bring the concept and value of WTI out of the specialist realm and into the mainstream of Intelligence Analysis, opening the "black box" to discussion and development.

Title: Humans vs. Artificial Intelligence: We won this round but what about the future?

Andrew Macpherson (University of New Hampshire), Jennifer Rose (Center for Pedagogical Innovation) & Taylor Nydam (University of New Hampshire)

Large Language Models (LLM) are a branch of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research. Researchers employing LLMs often attempt to have them generate human like responses to inputs. Anyone who has used Chat GPT quickly gets a feel for the power of LLMs. It took us around five years to collect data on 416 intelligence agencies in 113 countries. It took us less than an hour using Chat GPT. In this paper we describe how well Chat GPT did at our task and how reliable the results were. We conclude that we won this round but if we could train the model on our data the results would likely not favor the humans.

Use of ChatGPT and Artificial Intelligence by Cybercriminal and Non-State Actors. The impact of malicious use expands the aperture of capabilities of these actors to penetrate, disrupt, and destroy key network and external cybernetic targets.

Clayton Hawes (Independent Scholar)

Technology lies at the epicenter of our security systems. Whether that be in our home nation's defenses or offensive capabilities, the uses and potential uses of AI and ChatGPT by cybercriminals or other adversarial actors must not go unseen. Harnessing the use of AI and ChatGPT in cyber operations could prove to have devastating effects. Uses of ChatGPT, for instance, could be used in Information Operations (IO) to sow disinformation, benefitting a malicious actor's agenda. ChatGPT has become a tool proven to evade AI software through its advanced algorithm and code that bypasses AI safeguards. Further research and development (R&D) and refinement, especially as security concerns mount on AI models and their resiliency. This new innovative technology has the potential to enhance a wide range of military applications. Applications consisting of but not limited to military robotics, military medicine, intelligence analysis, information warfare, the use of autonomous weapons systems, and autonomous flight control of UAVs. This paper will analyze the impact of AI capabilities on this technology and explore its uses and or intended use for mass effect by cybercriminals to use against the U.S. and its allies.

Roundtable 1 – Russia's War Against Ukraine and the Importance of OSINT

Room: AUD 118

Chair: Samantha Lewis (Recorded Future, Manager of Strategic Geopolitics)

- Jack McCurley (Trainer and Technical Lead, Government Intelligence Services, Recorded Future)
- Julius Nicklasson (Manager, Intelligence Services, Recorded Future)
- Chris Holden (Chief Client Officer, Recorded Future)
- David Carver (Director: Assessments, Periodicals, and Executive Support)

Over a year into Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine, the field of open source intelligence has shifted tremendously. Recorded Future, the world's largest intelligence company, reflected on lessons learned and will address four key themes in our roundtable:

- To parse through the sheer amount of data on the war, Recorded Future relied on cross-functional teams of geopolitical and cyber subject matter experts to make sense of the holistic threat landscape.
- Partnerships between nation-states and private sector companies became critical to enable collective defense. Recorded Future's partnership with Ukraine has bolstered their cyber capabilities and wartime planning from a geopolitical perspective.

- The public sector became increasingly reliant on shareable intelligence, enabling Recorded Future to support them and the war at an unprecedented scale.
- Various private sector industries turned to unclassified intelligence to manage risk and day-to-day operations, and Recorded Future stepped in to fill these gaps.

Roundtable 2 – Critical Success Factors in European Intelligence Education: An Open Debate

Room: AUD 118

Chair/Discussant: Peter de Werd (Netherlands Defence Academy)

- Irena Chiru (Mihai Viteazul National Intelligence Academy, Romania)
- Georgică Panfil (European Defence and Security College)
- Aitana Radu (University of Malta)
- François Fisher (Intelligence College in Europe)

Intelligence in Europe is by definition characterized by a diversity of practices, historical backgrounds, and organisational architectures reflected in the composition and roles of intelligence communities and services. By mirroring national interests and contexts, intelligence in Europe is hence destined to be discussed and performed by a multiplicity of voices not always sharing similar regimes of knowledge.

Starting from this preliminary observation, this event/ round table will discuss the particularities of the intelligence training and education in Europe while exploring the opportunities for fostering coherence and professionalizing intelligence. To this goal, it will set the scene for an open discussion welcoming all peer intelligence actors representing intelligence training schools, academia, intelligence organizations. The debate will focus on the following questions:

- Which are the ingredients of a successful intelligence education program in Europe? How can we define success in a world of sharing on a need-to-know basis?
- The cooperation between academia and practitioners in the field of intelligence studies and practices has systematically proven to be a bone of contention. How does this look in different European national contexts?
- Which are the right ways to create a synergy between the peer intelligence actors in Europe (e.g. research programs, cooperation formats)?
- Usually, intelligence programs are designed as structured academic contexts - classroom based environments in which students observe and record material provided by an educator. How can they also incorporate self-regulated contexts of learning? And how can we tackle the challenge of educators being both knowledge deliverers, as in the traditional sense, and also facilitators in line with the new generations' patterns of knowledge?
- Which are the best opportunities for financing intelligence education research in Europe?
- Recent initiatives, such as the Intelligence College in Europe, have declared the aim of building a common strategic culture in intelligence. How can intelligence academic centers and training schools be contributors in the future?
- Which are the benefits of advancing common standards in intelligence education and which would be the prerequisites of a potential European common standards framework?

12 SEPTEMBER (TUESDAY)

Panel 4 – Intelligence Processes and Analysis

Room: AUD 118

Chair: Christoph Harig (Royal Danish Defence College)

Discussant: Irena Chiru (Mihai Viteazul National Intelligence Academy, Romania)

- Jan-Jaap Oerlemans (Utrecht University) & Sander Langenhuijzen (Dutch Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services)
- Katherine Hibbs Pherson (Pherson Associates)
- Tore Pedersen (Norwegian Intelligence School) & Pia Therese Jansen (Norwegian Defence University College)

Regulating Automated OSINT

Jan-Jaap Oerlemans (Utrecht University) & Sander Langenhuijzen (Dutch Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services)

With the availability of specialised tools, open source intelligence (OSINT) researchers are able to access vast amounts of data from multiple sources simultaneously, including commercial data and leaked information from social media services. In this paper, we argue that acquiring bulk of personal data and processing stolen and leaked information, can seriously interfere with the right to privacy and must be appropriately regulated. While intelligence and security services need to utilise OSINT tools and commercially available information to protect national security, it must be done in a controlled manner with sufficient safeguards to prevent abuse of power. Drawing upon our experience at the Dutch Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD), we outline an approach for intelligence and security services to lawfully process data acquired from OSINT. Our oversight body was the first to publish a report on this OSINT practice in February 2022. We believe that practitioners and other oversight bodies can learn from the Dutch experience and implement mitigating measures to ensure compliance with data processing principles in national security law. This paper provides valuable insights into the regulatory considerations surrounding OSINT and its implications for privacy and national security.

Analytic Thinking for Security and Cyber Operations

Katherine Hibbs Pherson (Pherson Associates)

Most of the intelligence analytic thinking skills we discuss in IAFIE were developed to deal with geopolitical problems. Good intelligence analysts know these skills apply across the board – from knotty intelligence problems to their everyday lives. But the translation to experts in operational fields does not always compute. Over the past twenty years, Pherson Associates has worked with a variety of communities to improve analytic thinking – we learn from each and adapt our materials and approaches. Our thesis: communities are more willing to invest and gain expertise in analytic thinking skills when their environments are more ambiguous and contain less reliable data. The more data, the more practitioners get consumed with the data rather than the concepts; dealing with the present and the past rather than looking to the future. This also leads to expectations that automated tools will provide the answer and that the humans who operate them do not have to be trained to think or question the machine's output.

This presentation:

- Explores the problem in two operational areas – security and cyber.
- Shares varied responses from practitioners to training – what works and what doesn't.

- Offers recommendations to guide continuing research to refine these concepts with ongoing transformational initiatives.

Fluent Secrets – Disfluent OSINTs: Effects of Cognitive Fluency vs Cognitive Disfluency on Analytic Reasoning and Analytic Reliability

Tore Pedersen (NORIS: Norwegian Intelligence School & Oslo New University College) and Pia Therese Jansen (Norwegian Defence University College & Norwegian Police University College)

In a randomized controlled experiment, we found that secret intelligence and identical open-source intelligence invoked different levels of cognitive strain on analysts when they assessed the credibility of an intelligence estimate. Whereas secret intelligence was processed with cognitive ease and thus promoted cognitive fluency, identical open-source intelligence was processed with cognitive effort and thus promoted cognitive disfluency. Cognitive fluency made analysts remain in an automatic intuitive judgment mode, whereas cognitive disfluency prompted analysts to exert a controlled analytic reasoning mode. A controlled analytic reasoning mode prompted analysts to carefully weigh and continuously update their assessments of intelligence credibility, whereas an automatic intuitive judgment prevented analysts from weighing and updating their initial assessments. Moreover, a controlled analytic reasoning mode made individual assessments become more aligned within the group and thus more reliable, whereas an automatic intuitive judgment mode made individual assessments become less aligned within the group and thus less reliable. In other words, cognitive fluency prompts an automatic intuitive judgment mode that reduces analytic reliability, whereas cognitive disfluency prompts a controlled analytic reasoning mode that increases analytic reliability. Taken together, cognitive fluency may exacerbate bias and reduce reliability in individual assessments, whereas cognitive disfluency may mitigate bias and increase reliability.

Panel 5 – Open Source Intelligence and AI

Room: Hercules

Chair: Craig Gruber (American University)

Discussant: Aitana Radu (University of Malta)

- Dirk Kolb & Philip Starz (Traversals Analytics and Intelligence)
- Bryson Payne & Edward Mienie (University of North Georgia)
- Vitalii Fedorienko (The National University of Defense of Ukraine)

AI-powered OSINT in use: Dynamic Frontline Monitoring Ukraine

Dirk Kolb and Philipp Starz ((Traversals Analytics and Intelligence)

We have developed the AI-supported Service Dynamic Frontline Monitoring Ukraine (DFMU), which provides analysts with comprehensive situational awareness in dynamic situations such as the war in Ukraine. Automated multi-lingual (English, Russian, Ukrainian) searches in relevant local data sources (Telegram, VKontakte, etc.) with an automated translation of content, entity recognition, geo-coding of recognized location information, image analysis (object recognition, scene identification, face recognition, Multilingual Optical Character Recognition,...) and event classification with 200+ categories have been integrated to gain key insights focused on frontline developments in Ukraine quickly. DFMU is self-learning and detects local changes in the frontline in Ukraine and automatically adjusts multilingual information retrieval. With the help of a geodatabase, localities in the vicinity of these areas are determined and from this, in turn, searches are carried out in the connected data sources with these place names. In addition, the system automatically dials into existing and nearby Telegram channels to receive live reports from contested battle areas. The location

information in the latest hits in the connected data sources can then influence the searches or dial into new Telegram channels. When new information contains location information that differs from the previously known front, the localities within the radius are automatically included in the new searches. DFMU supports analysts with various mapping options and track decks for individual frontline sections and provides advanced visualization capabilities for situational awareness.

Artificial Disruption: Near-Real-Time Disinformation with Deepfakes, ChatGPT and Generative AI
Bryson Payne and Edward Mienie (University of North Georgia)

Due to the recent confluence of a number of artificial intelligence technologies and capabilities, we are entering an age in which disinformation, fake news, and falsified images, videos and audio are rapidly becoming indistinguishable from authentic media. Over the past three years, deepfake videos, in which an actor's face can be replaced with a believable facsimile of a world leader or other famous person, have become relatively commonplace in popular culture, and deepfakes have been used at least at a rudimentary level in disinformation campaigns. ChatGPT, a generative large-language AI model that can produce authentic-sounding human-readable text, became widely available near the end of 2022 and can generate fake news articles, emails, and blog or social media posts in real-time that seem fluent and realistic to the reader. Added to these technologies, newer generative AI tools for creating audio, video, and photorealistic images can produce believable false images, video, and audio recordings that can lend additional credibility to disinformation, misinformation, and fake news faster than human reporters and government officials can fact-check or respond. This research examines the perfect storm of disinformation enabled by these combined technologies, and provides recommendations to governments and news organizations for countering AI-enhanced disruption.

Ways of Implementing OSINT Based on the Communication Actions of the Civilian Population at the Ukrainian Temporarily Occupied Territories
Vitalii Fedoriienko (The National University of Defense of Ukraine)

OSINT tools have spread significantly since the repelling large-scale aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The tools use is the result of the activity of the OSINT community. These tools are a source of information about the enemy activity for the civilian population. A new phenomenon is the filling the source of data up directly by the civilian population. Quite often, the interaction of both entities favors the implementation of strategic communications measures. This proves the mutual functioning of some OSINT technology and strategic communications together. There are social networks, messengers, and web services in Ukrainian society who faced with the challenges of the occupation today. These communication tools play a key role among the directions of OSINT. Then the challenge for the civilian population became effective communication with the military leadership and official authorities about the actions of the enemy. An important marker is the speed of the intelligence cycle, in particular data collection, processing and analysis. A model of an OSINT system based on data collection of messages from the local population about the location of the enemy is an example of the practical demonstration. This model is based on two components: data collection and a GIS.

Panel 6 – Intelligence Methods and Forecasting

Room: Niels Juel

Chair: Barry Zulauf (President, IAFIE)

Discussant: Adam Diderichsen (University of Southern Denmark)

- Gideon Manger (Netherlands Defence Academy)
- Jozef Kozlowski (War Studies University Warsaw)
- Raffaele Magurano (Police Officer, Italian Local Police)
- Terrence M O'Sullivan (University of New Hampshire) & James D. Ramsay (Macquarie University)

A systematic review of effectiveness in intelligence: perspectives from organizational theory

Gideon Manger (Netherlands Defense Academy, Leiden University)

Intelligence professionals and scholars routinely find themselves pondering whether their intelligence products and processes are any good. Some scholars list detailed accounts of intelligence failures and factors that led to them. They imply that the ability to accurately predict future events and their antecedents are measures of effectiveness for intelligence organizations. Others approach effectiveness from the perspective of analytical rigor and objectivity or on intelligence's contribution to decision-making. However, these approaches are fragmented and studying effectiveness of intelligence from an organizational perspective remains unaddressed in intelligence studies. Understanding effectiveness enables intelligence organizations to address multiple challenges, including resource allocation, innovation, change management, and organizational design. This paper addresses this void and answers the question "what constitutes effectiveness in intelligence organizations?" by conducting a systematic literature review of effectiveness in intelligence from the perspective of organizational effectiveness. It reviews 169 contributions from 2012 to 2022 that address effectiveness in intelligence from 16 relevant academic and professional journals. Consequently, it identifies four approaches (i.e. rigor, precision, utility, and intelligence failure) to evaluate intelligence effectiveness at varying levels of organizational analysis, and aligns them with the input, process, output, and outcome approaches of organizational effectiveness. Finally, it provides an agenda for further research.

Methodology and Ethics in Intelligence Analysis

Jozef Kozlowski (War Studies University, Warsaw)

Methodology and Ethics in Intelligence Analysis is a part of WSU scientific efforts to improve Intelligence Processes and Analysis as well as intelligence models and processes. It also proposes seven analytical commandments. Intelligence organizations always focus on methodology and related issues. However, there are also other important things that should be discussed — ethics and morality. Such elements are inextricably linked and always should be presented and described together. Only with all of these, we can identify bits and attributes that make a good analyst, elements that allow him to develop and emerge and mature into a kind of artist in his specific world. There are so many dangers and things he has to pay attention to survive in this particular information environment, also to save his mental and physical forces and have a long and distinguished professional career. An analyst is also a special kind of human, who should continuously improve at his job, fine-tune methods, techniques and tools as well as discover new tools and technologies. This should be complemented by an exchange with other analysts. Intelligence Analysis should also be considered as a rational thing and this leads us directly to the issue of the morality of thought. Then, seven analytical commandments are proposed by author. They are a result of the knowledge and experience of many distinguished analysts. This has been also an effort to find things that make a good analyst.

Forecasting Techniques: how Big Data and AI can affect their evolution? Are we approaching the dawn of a completely new “Forecasting System”?

Raffaele Magurano (Italian Local Police)

Forecasting techniques are essential tools for decision-making in various intelligence domains. However, traditional forecasting methods often may rely on historical data and statistical models that are subject to biases and make the analysts work to foresee difficult in the uncertainty of the real world. With the advent of big data and artificial intelligence (AI), new opportunities and challenges arise for improving forecasting efficiency, with some doubts on the accuracy. This paper reviews the current state-of-the-art and future trends of using big data and AI for forecasting purposes. It discusses how big data can provide rich and diverse sources of information for forecasting, such as social media, sensors, web analytics and text mining. It also examines how AI can enhance forecasting techniques by applying machine learning, deep learning, natural language processing and computer vision to extract patterns, trends and insights from big data. The paper also explores the potential impacts of big data and AI on a futural “Forecasting System”, such as enabling real-time and dynamic forecasting, increasing automation and scalability, and creating new forms of human-machine interaction. The paper concludes that big data and AI can transform forecasting techniques into more powerful and intelligent tools to deal with uncertain environments.

Bridging the Intelligence-Public Health/Pandemic Security Chasm

Terrence M. O’Sullivan (University of New Hampshire) and James Ramsay (Macquarie University)

Covid-19 should have had a far greater conceptual/analytical impact on intelligence practice and pedagogy, given the pandemic’s catastrophic effects on traditional security drivers such as economics, trade, and public health. However, insufficient training and cognitive/cultural barriers persist in intelligence practice and education which prevent environmental public health variables being operationally integrated into analytical intelligence risk analysis. Public health has long recognized growing global pandemic risk but had little experience understanding the geopolitical implications, while both intelligence and human conflict experts have little true understanding of pandemic threats and climate change impacts. This chasm must be bridged, and these communities brought closer together to avoid ineffective intelligence analysis that would impair national security. We claim the world is ironically less prepared now for the pandemics than before Covid, and democratic nations subsequently remain at high risk of societal instability and authoritarianism. Since the traditional intelligence education is unaccustomed to public health security analysis, a cultural institutional shift must occur to educate analysts (current and future) on broader comparative human-environmental risks. This paper proposes how to integrate epidemiology, climate science, public health, and data analysis into academic degree programs and in-service training levels, embracing open-source intelligence in collaboration with public health experts.

Panel 7 – Intelligence Cultures and Collaboration

Room: AUD 75

Chair: Frederic S Baron (Office of the Director of National Intelligence)

Discussant: Cristina Ivan (Mihai Viteazul National Intelligence Academy, Romania)

- Ofer Guterman (Institute for the Research of the Methodology of Intelligence)
- Adam Svendsen (International intelligence and defence strategist)
- John Nomikos (Research Institute for European and American Studies)
- Eleni Braat (Utrecht University)
- Ahmed ElTahir Abubakr (Emirates Academy for Identity and Citizenship)

Open Intelligence: A new framework for relations between intelligence organizations and the civilian environment

Ofer Guterman (Institute for the Research of the Methodology of Intelligence)

Intelligence organizations are undergoing significant changes, in accordance with the sea changes in the human reality in which they operate. One of the most important changes concerns the unprecedented openness to the civilian environment. However, this paradigmatic change lacks a systematic and holistic reference in professional and academic writing on intelligence. The objective of this paper is to propose an integrative framework of such a concept, which can be called "open intelligence", and includes five interrelated components: intelligence involvement in national security issues concerning global civilian threats which go beyond the security-military sphere (such as climate change and public health); civil-intelligence partnerships in collection activities, analysis and operations being held in the digital realm, necessitated by the OSINT revolution; need for intelligence organizations to embed themselves within civilian STEM-ecosystems in order to preserve technological superiority; obligation to share intelligence assessments with the public, in an era of fake news and truth decay; and movement towards human capital strategies more symbiotic with the public and the private sectors. The article also examines barriers to promoting the concept of open intelligence, such as the intelligence organizations' culture of secrecy, civil reservations about cooperation with intelligence organizations, and other ethical and democratic dilemmas.

Near yet far? Understanding Intelligence Liaison 20 years after 9/11

Adam D.M. Svendsen (International intelligence and defence strategist)

Highly secretive 'intelligence liaison' has become better understood since 9/11, enabling communication of further practitioner-relevant insights. However, when the developing body of intelligence liaison literature published to date is reviewed, persistent discernible paucities exist with many defence and security implications. Remaining deserving of further emphasis so that analyses advance beyond adopting merely more narrative historical evaluative lenses and their associated case studies, intelligence liaison 'systems' and 'enterprises', indeed 'ecosystems', are worthy of more central positioning. Thereby, better acknowledging 'complexity', more advanced and sophisticated 'framing' to 'analysis' in Intelligence Studies to its education beyond is thus enabled. Simultaneously benefiting practice through enhanced uptake to embedding, that last greater complementary foregrounding of a variety of different 'systems'-related approaches is necessitated as today - facilitated via federation-/system-of-systems-based factors and indicators - situations and conditions of 'Intelligence Engineering' prevail increasingly dominantly in and across all intelligence to defence and security contexts. Much shaping impact emerges. Extending into the future, both in terms of its understanding to implementation, intelligence liaison considerably benefits via the adoption of these more elaborate systems thinking-related approaches. Being close at hand nearby, much multi-focused improvement is soon possible.

European Intelligence Academy (EIA): Open Sources (OSINT) and Intelligence Studies in the European Union

John M. Nomikos (Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS))

European Intelligence Cooperation is the most important weapon in the fight against the new threats in the 27 European Union member states. The article emphasizes the strategic role of the European Intelligence Academy (EIA) founded in 2013 in Athens as a transcontinental network of intelligence scholars, practitioners and students, who are dedicated to international collaborations in intelligence research and scholarship. Even though effective intelligence cooperation is hard to achieve even at the national level as different services compete for resources and attention from the decision-makers, past terrorist activities in Europe served as a wake up for the European Union member states to promote training and academic educational programs in intelligence studies.

Fighting Fire with Fire. Politicization of Greek intelligence culture after the junta regime (1974-2008)

Eleni Braat (Utrecht University)

Intelligence services potentially hold power-resources that any office-aspiring politician would like to control. The increase in party-political ties (politicization) among intelligence officers is sometimes identified a threat to bureaucratic professionalism, but it may also provide welcome supervision of the agency's 'deep' and relatively lightly controlled powers. This paper explains the persistent politicization of the Greek intelligence service in the decades following the demise of the Junta-regime and its democratic consolidation (1974-2008). It shows that subsequent governments fought fire with fire in their efforts to democratize the service. Their efforts entailed a feebly demilitarized and intensely politicized service. Moreover, a vibrant bottom-up party-aligned labor union within the service became the main vehicle for the politicization of the organizational culture. This research uses original oral history interviews with former service personnel, publications in newspapers of several political colors, and parliamentary debates on the Service between 1974 and 2008. This is the first research on the Greek intelligence service based on such a large-scale, longitudinal, and diverse empirical data collection. The results of this research are relevant beyond the specific case of Greece as it points to the wider mechanisms of politicization of intelligence services, especially in cases where an authoritarian legacy necessitates demilitarization as part of the democratic consolidation process.

Cognitive Diversity as a Key Driver for Promoting Inter-Agency Intelligence Collaboration

Ahmed ElTahir Abubakr (Emirates Academy for Identity and Citizenship – The Federal Authority for Identity, Citizenship, Customs and Ports Security - United Arab Emirates)

Scholarly literature and previous studies indicate that there are various challenges in the process of collaboration and coordination between different intelligence community entities, internally or externally, due to the diversity of cultures in intelligence agencies. This is mainly attributed to the difficulty in understanding the social and cultural norms of others, which hinders the process of communication and collaboration between different agencies. As the intelligence community evolves in several areas to include increased communication, coordination, and integration, great emphasis should be placed on developing and refining the diverse cognitive skills of the staff of these institutions for effective and sustainable intelligence services. Cognitive Diversity demonstrates the diversity in attitudes, beliefs, and core values through individuals' background and experience. Some scholars argue the hypothesis that if the intelligence community recognizes well the concept of cognitive diversity, then a high level of cooperation between different intelligence communities is likely, leading to problem-solving and informed decision-making in times of crisis. This paper uses qualitative research method, analyzing case studies from the UAE, USA and Europe, to explore the concept of cognitive diversity in inter-agency intelligence collaboration. The paper tempts to address the research question: How can cognitive diversity improve levels of collaboration between multiple intelligence agencies, both domestically and abroad? The findings of the research outlines the factors of cognitive diversity that lead to improved interagency collaboration in intelligence agencies.

Roundtable 3 – Intelligence Education: Imperative for Change

Room: AUD 118

Chair: James D. Ramsay (Macquarie University)

Discussant: David Strachan-Morris (University of Leicester)

- Robin Lobb (Zeroes & Ones, Inc.)
- Sabrina Magris (École Universitaire Internationale, Italy)
- Barry Zulauf (President, IAFIE)

Intelligence education is critical to a nation's ability to create an appropriately trained and educated workforce. The lack of standard education practices and consensus student learning outcomes has led to an uneven distribution of skills and abilities in the intelligence workforce. Moreover, allies and 5-eyes partners do not share a common education framework or set of student learning outcomes. Given recent events, what is clear is that there are significant knowledge and skill deficits in the current intelligence workforce in climate change, public health, data analytics and cybersecurity, etc. Further, it is increasingly evident that students need to better understand the dynamic tension between secrecy and security on one hand and transparency on the other. Each of these deficits can be addressed and integrated into undergraduate education where the bulk of the workforce originates. However, challenges to systematically upskilling the intelligence workforce through higher education include: the lack of an accreditation framework which constrains the adoption and integration of emergent student learning outcomes, and the lack a common set of intelligence education standards among allied nations. This roundtable will discuss the current state of intelligence education across the US, UK, Canada, Europe, and Australia and suggest potential solutions that advance the intelligence profession through education.

Panel 8 – Intelligence Tradecraft and Training

Room: AUD 75

Chair: Katherine Hibbs Pherson (Pherson Associates)

Discussant: Nis Leerskov Mathiesen (Royal Danish Defence College)

- Omid Townsend (King's College London)
- Freddy Murstad (Norwegian University of Science and Technology)
- Bram Spoor, Sebastiaan Rietjens & Erik de Waard (Netherlands Defence Academy)
- David Strachan-Morris (University of Leicester)

Enhancing Civilian and Student Counterintelligence Capabilities through Short Course

Omid Townsend (King's College London)

The rapidly changing security landscape in Europe necessitates the development and adaptation of intelligence education and training for both professionals and civilians. This paper proposes an innovative approach to civilian and student counterintelligence training through short courses covering surveillance, report writing, elicitation, and subject matter familiarization. These courses aim to equip participants with the skills needed to meet the future demands of European intelligence actors in the face of emerging threats. The paper will provide an overview of the current state of intelligence education in Europe and its evolution in response to changes in the security environment. We will examine the integration of innovative teaching methods, such as scenario-based teaching, problem-based learning, and research-integrating activities to enhance the learning experience and promote critical thinking skills. Furthermore, we will discuss the

importance of developing skills to mitigate bias and uncertainty in intelligence analysis and reporting. Emphasis will be placed on the need for tailored training to address the specific requirements of intelligence institutions across Europe. Finally, we will explore the potential benefits and challenges of implementing short courses for civilians and students in counterintelligence, including the potential for fostering a more robust and adaptive intelligence community capable of addressing future threats in the region.

Current advances in approaches to intelligence tradecraft

Freddy Murstad (Norwegian University of Science and Technology)

This research project will attempt to identify advancements in current approaches to intelligence tradecraft in the Intelligence Community (IC) and Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) programs in the private sector. Then introduce analytical tradecraft training to CTI practitioners in the private sector, based on experiences and lessons learned from the IC, and compare and contrast changes and results of intelligence products and services delivered to decision makers to assess impact. The current hypothesis is that transferring knowledge and experience of intelligence tradecraft and analytical proficiency from the IC into the CTI field will significantly enhance how CTI practitioners and managers approach analytical challenges and deliver results to their primary stakeholders. It will also benefit decision-makers as the finished intelligence products and services will be better aligned with the Intelligence Requirements (IR) and adapted to the organisation's needs.

The complexity of the grey-zone: the experience of military intelligence on NATO's north-eastern flank

Bram Spoor, Sebastiaan Rietjens and Erik de Waard (Netherlands Defence Academy)

Conflicts are increasingly complex. As a result, much is being written on e.g. the changing character of war, the blurring between peace and war and the weaponization of means outside the conventional military domain. Often these developments are described as grey-zone or hybrid warfare and are examined at the level of war. Very little, however, is known on how military personnel on the ground experience this complexity in their daily work. This paper contributes to filling this gap. It focuses on the experiences of the Multinational Corps North-East in Poland and the Baltic States against the background of the Russo-Ukrainian war, Belarusian migrant crisis and NATO's response to these and other challenges on its north-eastern flank. The research is based on extensive data collection, including more than 50 semi-structured interviews with NATO military intelligence personnel at various levels (corps, division, battlegroup) as well as numerous observations during the 4 field visits the authors made. The analysis is structured around the personnel's perception of the operational environment, their comprehension of complexity and how NATO has organized intelligence for dealing with such complexity. The conclusion draws on the nexus of complexity science and organizational theory to reflect on the organizational validity of military intelligence with regard to complex problems.

Framing, Defining, and Studying Military Intelligence

Dr. David Strachan-Morris (University of Leicester)

The field of intelligence studies is beginning to move beyond its initial focus on intelligence at the state level, with more recent work examining the sub-state level, including non-state actors both violent (insurgents, terrorists) and non-violent (commercial organisations or NGOs). As a result of the expansion of intelligence studies into new areas it is becoming increasingly clear that intelligence behaves differently in different environments, with wide variations in requirements, approach consumers, and policymakers. While military intelligence has been an object of study from an historical perspective, it has so far largely escaped scrutiny by intelligence studies beyond accounts of past failures and technical examinations of its processes and procedures. This paper will frame and define military intelligence as a discipline and a product, with a unique set of behaviours and characteristics due to its place in military decision-making and planning processes, and

the relationship between intelligence and policy. It will also demonstrate that examination of Military Intelligence through perspectives used to look at state level intelligence – oversight, failure, politicisation, and ethics, for example – offers up new insights into the production and use of intelligence in a military context that improve our understanding of it as a unique sphere of activity.

Panel 9 – Deception and Fake News

Room: AUD 118

Chair: Bill Spracher (Vice President, IAFIE)

Discussant: Sabrina Magris (École Universitaire Internationale, Italy)

- Netanel Flamer (Bar-Ilan University)
- Gareth Jones (Tiaki Akoako (AUT University)
- William L. Mitchell (Chief Adviser, Danish Special Operations Command)
- Tony Ingesson (Lund University)

Asymmetric Battle of Wits: Exploring the Role of Deception in Asymmetric Conflict – Israel vs. Hamas

Netanel Flamer (Bar-Ilan University/Reichman University)

Deception is one of the most significant elements in stratagem. It goes hand in hand with intelligence. Planning the right deception demands a deep analysis of the opponent on a diverse levels: how they currently perceive the situation, which sensors provide them with intelligence and the content and quality of intelligence from each sensor, what is the intelligence puzzle that would create the desired response for the planners of the deception etc.. In the case of asymmetric conflict the deception takes on a unique form; the weak side in the conflict, can use the deception to bridge the inherent gap in capabilities when facing the strong opponent. On the other hand, the strong side in the conflict can use their intelligence advantage to implement an effective deception enabling them to strengthen their achievements and minimize losses. This research wishes to examine deception as an element in asymmetric conflict, based on a test case of the ongoing asymmetric war between Israel and Hamas. Throughout the years of conflict between the two sides, there have been deception activities on both sides some of which have been revealed to the general public. The research will analyze central deception campaigns carried out within the conflict, and will shed light on the role of deception in asymmetric conflict in general and specifically in cases conflicts between states and Violent Non-State Actors.

Collective communities, trusted networks, the impact of disinformation, misinformation and mistrust by these communities of government

Gareth Jones

Affiliations: Tiaki Akoako (Maori Indigenous Academic/ New Zealand), AUT University

Ethnic and Indigenous communities generally work in social structures which are based upon trusted networks and are collective in nature. They are potentially more exposed to disinformation, misinformation via social media and more commonly governments are not trusted by these communities. This is ironic in the sense that governments generally lead the strategies against misinformation or disinformation, yet ethnic and indigenous communities have traditionally not trusted state governments. The paper will examine the influence of disinformation, misinformation on collective communities and how governments address issues of mistrust. Misinformation and disinformation has become a real phenomena in recent times. The countering of misinformation and disinformation is an important work which brings tech companies, civil society and government together. The countering of misinformation has become an important part of

intelligence, security and police agencies in more recent times with significant resources allocated to responding to this phenomena. Europe's ethnic communities are growing with the advent of refugees, migration and birth rates are generally higher than local populations. Some consideration should be given to the future and how states work to engage with these communities to address these challenges. The solutions may be considering other world views or non-eurocentric thinking, this will require an openness and willingness by European states to listen, learn and effectively engage with these Indigenous and ethnic communities.

Operational Timeline Deception Projection and Detection in the Age of Social Media

William L. Mitchell (Danish Special Operations Command)

Over the last five years, social media, on the back of smartphones, has penetrated every aspect of societal life, including the conduct of war. Consequently, every human with a smartphone is a potential sensor for parties in conflict. At the same time, there has been exponential growth in open-source analysis, and hobbyists are ready to provide detailed analysis, including geo-location and image verification. This paper will examine the different aspects of deception and counter-deception related to the latest social media and open-source developments and how this affects the environment surrounding operational planning. The theoretical framework is provided by Clark and Mitchell's, *Deception, Counter deception, and Counterintelligence* (2019), and the case studies will be drawn from open-source experiences of the Russian-Ukraine conflict. The focus will be on the possible parties' projection and perception of operational timelines solely based on open-source and social media monitoring.

Predictable Professionals or Artistic Agents? The Role of Creativity and Originality in Deception and Manipulation

Tony Ingesson (Lund University)

Professionalization is a growing trend in intelligence organizations. However, unlike the traditional professions, intelligence practitioners frequently find themselves locked in a struggle with an intelligent antagonist. One key aspect of professionalization, the teaching of structured, scientifically based knowledge and best practices, can lead to predictability. This creates a vulnerability that can be exploited by an antagonist. Using a theoretical framework built on contributions from Clausewitz and Reflexive Control theory, together with examples from Napoleon's campaign in Northern Italy and a 1980s KGB deception operation to conceal a mole in the CIA, it is shown how personal qualities, creativity and unpredictability rather than conformity are required to prevail against an intelligent, well-informed and capable antagonist. Thus, both the military decision-maker and the intelligence analyst have more in common with a chess player than a traditional professional.

Roundtable 4 – Countering Disinformation: Pointers for Educators in Intelligence and National Security

Room: Niels Juel

Chair: Randy Pherson (Pherson Associates)

- Peter de Werd (Netherlands Defence Academy)
- Cristina Ivan (Mihai Viteazul National Intelligence Academy, Romania)
- Carol Choksy (Indiana University Bloomington)

Disinformation has emerged as a significant threat to national security. Developing a nuanced understanding of the workings and complexities of this phenomenon is crucial for assessing the effectiveness of countering

strategies and informing the design of adequate teaching methodologies. The roundtable aims to reflect on various aspects of disinformation, including its definition and categorization, its operation and impact, the leveraging of cognitive biases to perpetrate disinformation, and the role of new technology. Of particular concern is the use of false narratives and the need to develop strategies to combat their effectiveness. In terms of mitigation, the importance of international collaboration and the value of multiple perspectives for verifying information, identifying false or misleading claims, and communicating this information is discussed. Also considered will be the utility of developing and projecting constructive narratives to “take the oxygen away” from the propagation of false narratives. Lastly, strategies and practices for teaching about disinformation in the context of intelligence and national security are reviewed, exploring future challenges, and opportunities of how to engage students in critical thinking, for example, in ways that also leverage students' life worlds and developments in social media.

Roundtable 5 – The Future of Structured Analytical Techniques and the Role of Academia

Room: AUD 118

Chair: Jim Poole (Analytical Trainer & Consultant)

- John Pyrik (Analytical Trainer)
- Randy Pherson (Pherson Associates)
- Ole Donner (Strukturierte Analyse Deutschland)
- John Wayne Ross (Privy Council Office, Government of Canada)

Analysis is a challenging discipline. It relies on good thinking which requires time, and time is luxury analysts almost never have. Information overload is a given as is the presence of disinformation and a low signal-to-noise ratio. Nothing is more certain than uncertainty which is both an uncomfortable side-effect and an equally uncomfortable end-result that can never be eliminated. The future is likely to bring us more of the same: more information, more time pressure, more uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity. Structured Analytic Techniques (SATs) can help analysts navigate the challenges they encounter. Are SATs also the future? How can future academic research best support the development and use of SATs by intelligence analysts? Our roundtable will try to answer these questions by asking:

- What is the future of intelligence analysis? How is the discipline of analysis likely to change over the next ten years?
- How will the use of SATs evolve considering prospective changes to analysis?
- What role does academia have in developing SATs and advising on how they are used? What role does academia have in teaching SATs?
- What avenues of research on SATs would be the most productive? Where should the focus be?

13 SEPTEMBER (WEDNESDAY)

Roundtable 6 – Russian Intelligence Practices during the War in Ukraine, 2022-2023

Room: AUD 118

Chair: Olga Bertelsen (Tiffin University)

Discussant: Tom Røseth (Norwegian Defence University College)

- Olga Bertelsen (Tiffin University)
- Sergei Zhuk (Ball State University)
- Amir Fleischman (Cicom Global)

This roundtable focuses on Russian intelligence practices in Ukraine and beyond, including the establishment of filtration camps, the use of special and paramilitary forces in occupied territories, and information warfare. These practices will be discussed from a historical perspective and placed in the context of Russia's war in Ukraine. The participants will compare the Soviet practices during WWII of establishing camps for "screening and filtration" of PoWs and civilians and the Russian practices of creating filtration camps for Ukrainian civilians and the military where the Russians "test" them for loyalty to Russia. Special attention will be paid to the use of special and paramilitary forces in occupied Ukrainian territories, such as Vympel and the Wagner group, and the use of fake news and active measures designed to promote pro-Kremlin narratives around the world. The objective of this roundtable is to contextualize Russia's genocidal practices in Ukraine and the continuity of Russian intelligence traditions.

Roundtable 7 – Intelligence Practices in Scandinavia

Room: AUD 118

Chair: Kira Vrist Rønn (University of Southern Denmark)

- Tony Ingesson (Lund University)
- Nadja Hestehave (Norwegian Police University College)
- Tallat Rønn Shakoor (University of Southern Denmark)
- Adam Diderichsen (University of Southern Denmark)

This Roundtable addresses the specificities of intelligence practices in the Scandinavian countries. Anglo-American intelligence cultures and cases have so far dominated within Intelligence Studies. However, the Scandinavian well-fare states differ in important respect from the American (and to a lesser extent British) context. Among the key distinguishing characteristics is a high level of equality and trust. With this roundtable we wish to present a series of critical perspectives addressing intelligence practices in the Scandinavian countries. We will encourage a scholarly discussion on whether there is such a thing as a unique context-specific, Scandinavian intelligence practice. We will present perspectives on democratic accountability and juridical control in Scandinavia, and we will specify the particular nature of intelligence work in a small-state context such as the legitimacy that derives from cooperation with powerful allies. Furthermore, we wish to invite to discussions on intelligence ethics and whether high ethical intelligence standards are specifically relevant in the Scandinavian well-fare systems. Finally, we will address the negotiation of intelligence needs in the small-state Scandinavian context and the role and meaning of trust in Scandinavian intelligence practices.

IMPORTANT PRACTICAL INFORMATION

The Conference will take place at the Royal Danish Defence College, Svanemøllen Barracks, Ryvangs Allé 1, 2100 København Ø.

Please take note of the following important information:

As the conference is held at a military establishment, the following security measures will be in place:

- **You must bring a photo-ID document in order to gain access to the premises.** There will be access controls every morning. Participants arriving by themselves will be registered at the main gate. Participants arriving with the conference busses will be registered when boarding the bus. Please allow some extra time for these checks when planning your arrival at the conference venue/the bus transport.
- Participants will receive an IAFIE-badge during the first registration on the morning of the 11th September. Please arrive early to allow time for registration.
- The IAFIE-badge must be worn visibly at all times when participants are present at military establishments. It does not contain any personal information. Personal photo-ID must also be carried at all times (not visibly)

MAP OF SVANEMØLLEN BARRACKS

Plenary events will take place in the Auditorium of Building 118 (AUD 118)

Some panels and roundtables will take place in the Auditorium of Building 75 (AUD 75), Niels Juel (Building 23), and Hercules (Building 38).

Please see the map below for your orientation. There will be signs on campus as well as staff members assisting you to find your way to the different rooms.

